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Abstract—This paper studies the transmit antenna selection in
massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap chan-
nels, also termed as multiple-input multiple-output multiple-
eavesdropper (MIMOME) channels. The transmitter, equipped
with a large-scale antenna array whose size is much larger than
that of the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper, selects a subset
of antennas to transmit messages. A branch-and-bound (BAB)
search based algorithm for antenna selection in independent and
identical distributed Rayleigh flat fading channel is proposed to
maximize the secrecy capacity between the transmitter and the
legitimate receiver when the transmit power is equally allocated
into the selected antennas. Furthermore, the proposed algorithm
is separately applied to two scenarios which is based on whether
the channel side information of the eavesdropper (CSIE) is
available at the transmitter. Simulation results show that the
proposed algorithm has the same performance as the exhaustive
search under both scenarios but with much lower complexity.
Index Terms—Massive MIMO wiretap channel, physical layer
security, transmit antenna selection
I. INTRODUCTION
Data flux in wireless networks has experienced an explosive
growth with the sharp increment of the amount of smart
devices. With the rapid growing demand for transmission
rate, the significance of transmission security and reliability
has become increasingly prominent. In this respect, physical
layer (PHY) security [1] has gained pivotal attention in recent
years for its remarkable performance in information security
enhancement.
Wyner in [1] proposed the basic model for physical layer
security i.e., the wiretap channel, in which the transmitted
messages to a legitimate receiver are being overheard by
an eavesdropper. Different from the traditional cryptographic
techniques [2], physical layer security utilizes the inherent
characteristics of wireless channels to ensure reliable trans-
mission. Recently, researchers devoted to PHY security have
shown an increased interest in multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) wiretap channels, also referred to as multiple-input
multiple-output multiple-eavesdropper (MIMOME) channels
[3], where multiple antennas are deployed at each of the
three terminals. The works in [4], [5] investigated the secrecy
capacity of MIMOME channels in light of information theory.
This paper will be presented at IEEE Wireless Communications and
Networking Conference (WCNC), 2019. And thanks for the support from
my coauthor Mr. Zeliang Ou and my supervisor Mr. Hongwen Yang.
[6] extended these work to large-scale systems, which demon-
strated the significant improvements of transmission security
and reliability in massive MIMOME channel compared to the
small-scale one. More specifically, the transmitter can reduce
the information disclosure to the eavesdroppers by focusing
its main transmit beam to the legitimate receivers [6].
Radio-frequency (RF) chain is an expensive component that
each antenna should be equipped with, which accounts for
high hardware cost in large-scale system. However, antenna
selection (AS) technology [7] is regarded as an alternative to
alleviate the requirement on the RF transceivers by selecting
a subset of antennas to transceive signals. Up to now, the
research on AS in MIMOME channels has tended to focus on
the closed-form expressions of secrecy capacity under different
scenarios but ignore the algorithm design. Most of them
merely consider single-antenna selection and the correspond-
ing analytical expression of the secrecy outage probability [8]–
[12]. However, a few researches discussed the performance
of multiple-antenna selection and very simplistic algorithms
were applied to it, such as the norm-based method [13], [14].
Furthermore, few literatures focused on the algorithm design
of multiple-antenna selection in massive MIMOME channels.
This paper concentrates on transmit antenna selection (TAS)
algorithm design in massive MIMOME channels. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first time to propose
an optimal multiple transmit antenna selection algorithm in
massive MIMOME channels, the complexity of which is
much lower than that of exhaustive search. For simplicity,
assume that the total transmit power is uniformly allocated
over the selected antennas and the channel side information
of the legitimate receiver (CSIL) is available. An optimal TAS
algorithm is proposed to maximize the secrecy capacity in
massive MIMOME channels and discussed in two scenarios:
1) For Scenario A: the eavesdropper’s channel side information
is unavailable at the transmitter (NCSIE), and 2) For Scenario
B: the eavesdropper’s channel side information (CSIE) is
available. In each scenario, simulation results demonstrate that
the proposed algorithm obtains an optimal solution at the
expense of much lower complexity than exhaustive search.
The remaining parts of this manuscript is structured as
follows: Section II describes the system model. In Section III,
the optimal TAS algorithm is proposed. The simulation results
and corresponding analysis are shown in Section IV. Finally,
Section V concludes the paper.
Notations: Scalars, vectors and matrices are denoted by
non-bold, bold lower case, and bold upper letters, respectively.
C stands for the complex numbers. The Hermitian and inverse
of matrix H is indicated with H† and H−1, and IN is the
N×N identity matrix.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, we consider a massive MIMO wiretap channel.
The transmitter is equipped with Nt antennas, the legitimate
receiver is equipped with Nr antennas and the eavesdropper
is equipped with Ne antennas. The received signal vector at
the legitimate receiver reads
ym =
√
ρmHmx+wm, (1)
where x ∈ CNt×1 is the transmitted signal with unit power,
ρm is the Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) at each receive antenna
of the legitimate receiver and wm∼CN (0, INt) is the additive
complex Gaussian noise. Assume that the transmitted symbols
from different antennas are independent. Considering inde-
pendent and identical distributed (i.i.d) Rayleigh flat fading
channel, the elements in channel matrix Hm∈CNr×Nt are
i.i.d. complex Gaussian random variables following CN (0, 1).
Assume that the eavesdropper channel is still suffering i.i.d.
Rayleigh flat fading with Gaussian noise. Let ρe denote the
SNR at each antenna of the eavesdropper, the received signal
in the eavesdropper is given by
ye =
√
ρeHex+we. (2)
The secrecy capacity between the transmitter and the legiti-
mate receiver is then written as [5]
Cs = [Cm − Ce]+ , (3)
where [x]+
△
= max{x, 0}, Ce and Cm denote the channel
capacity over the eavesdropper channel and the legitimate
channel, respectively. Assume that the transmit power is
uniformly allocated, Ce and Cm can be written as [15]
Cm = log2 det
(
INt +
ρm
Nt
HmH
†
m
)
(4a)
Ce = log2 det
(
INe +
ρe
Nt
HeH
†
e
)
. (4b)
Then, consider the TAS at the transmitter and suppose L
antennas are selected. Actually, selecting a subset of trans-
mit antennas, in other words, is to select the corresponding
columns of the channel matrix. Let H˜m and H˜e denote the
submatrix after TAS, the secrecy capacity has the following
expression:
Cs =

log2

det
(
INt + ρmH˜mH˜
†
m
)
det
(
INe + ρeH˜eH˜
†
e
)




+
, (5)
where ρm =
ρm
L
and ρe =
ρe
L
are defined as the normalized
SNR.
III. TAS ALGORITHM
In this section, an optimal TAS algorithm with low complex-
ity in massive MIMOME channels is formulated. We assume
that full CSIL is available at the transmitter.
Most of the TAS algorithms used in MIMOME channels are
norm-based [13], [14] i.e., to select L antennas corresponding
to the largest L norms of the column vectors in the channel
matrix Hm. The norm-based method is of low complexity
but moderately poor performance. Exhaustive search (ES) is
definitely an optimal algorithm, but it is prohibitively complex
and even impractical for its huge complexity especially under
large-scale scenario. Does an optimal algorithm exist for
TAS with much lower complexity in contrast to the ES?
Branch-and-bound (BAB) method [16], [17] could answer this
question.
BAB was used for receive antenna selection in massive
MIMO system [17]. In the followings, consider two scenarios
stated before depending on whether the CSIE is available or
not, and propose corresponding BAB based algorithms for
these situations respectively. It’s shown that the proposed BAB
in Section III-A is equivalent to that in [17], but the algorithm
in Section III-B is totally different.
A. NCSIE
In this case, the transmitter knows nothing about the eaves-
dropper channel and the transmitted power is uniformly allo-
cated to the selected antennas. Since the CSIE is unavailable
at the transmitter, only the legitimate channel is considered in
antenna selection. In this setup, the antenna selection for the
eavesdropper channel could be treated as a random selection.
Let S denote the selected subset of transmit antenna indexes
whose cardinality is |S| = L. The transmit antenna selection
problem could be formulated as
Sopt = argmax
S∈M
log2 det
(
INr + ρmH˜mH˜
†
m
)
(6)
whereM denotes the full set of all the candidate column index
subsets with size L.
Let Hm,n denote the submatrix of legitimate channel after
n antennas are selected and Cm,n denote the corresponding
channel capacity. Assuming that the kth row hk of matrix
Hm is selected in the (n+ 1) step, n = 0, 1, · · · , L − 1, the
updated channel submatrix is [Hm,n,hk] the capacity can be
derived as
Cm,n+1 = log2 det
(
INr + ρmHm,n+1H
†
m,n+1
)
= log2 det
(
INr + ρmHm,nHm,n
† + ρmhkh
†
k
)
= Cm,n + log2 det
(
INr + ρmTm,nhkh
†
k
)
(a)
= Cm,n + log2
(
1 + ρmh
†
kTm,nhk
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆k,n
,
(7)
where Tm,n =
(
INr + ρmHm,nH
†
m,n
)−1
and Tm,0 = INr .
The last equality (a) holds for the Sylvesters determinant
root
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Fig. 1. An example search tree for branch-and-bound algorithm when Nt = 6
and L = 2. The number besides each node is the index of this antenna. An
entire path from the root to any tip nodes in Level 2 is a antenna selection
result.
identity [18] det (I+AB) = det (I+BA). By the Sherman-
Morrison formula [18], the computation for the matrix inverse(
INr + ρmHm,nH
†
m,n
)−1
is simplified. Let Kn+1 denote the
antenna index selected in the (n+ 1)th step, Tm,n+1 can be
conveniently expressed in the following recursive form
Tm,n+1 =
(
INr + ρmHm,nH
†
m,n + ρmhKn+1h
†
Kn+1
)−1
= Tm,n − tn+1t†n+1,
(8)
where tn+1 =
Tm,nhKn+1√
(ρm)
−1+h†
Kn+1
Tm,nhKn+1
. Define
φKn+1,n+1 = h
†
Kn+1
Tm,n+1hKn+1 , which can be updated as
φKn+1,n+1 = h
†
Kn+1
Tm,n+1hKn+1
= h†Kn+1
(
Tm,n − tn+1t†n+1
)
hKn+1
= φKn+1,n −
∣∣ξKn+1,n+1∣∣2 ,
(9)
where ξKn+1,n+1 = h
†
Kn+1
tn+1. Therefore, ∆k,n can be
written as ∆k,n = log2 (1 + ρmφk,n).
The BAB search is a classical algorithm in integer program-
ming [16], [17] which achieves the optimal solution but holds
much lower complexity than exhaustive search. To use branch-
and-bound search, a search tree as decribed in Fig. 1 is built
to implement the whole search. One can see from Fig. 1 that
the depth of the search tree is (L+ 1). The exhausitive search
is to traverse the whole tree. To apply branch-and-bound into
TAS, the object function Cm,n is adjusted to C˜m,n,
C˜m,n = Cm,n −
n−1∑
a=0
Za, (10)
where Za = log2
(
1 + ρmζ
2
a
)
, and ζ2a = maxk∈Ia h
†
khk,
Z0 = 0. The index set Ia consists of all the candidate
antenna set in the ath level. In the section that follows, the
monotonicity of the new object function C˜m,n is derived in
detail. According to the definition of C˜m,n, one can see that
C˜m,n+1 = C˜m,n +∆Kn+1,n − Zn. (11)
Equ. (8) shows that Tm,n+1 = INr−
∑n+1
a=1 tat
†
a as Tm,0 =
INr , then
h
†
Kn+1
Tm,n+1hKn+1 − h†Kn+1hKn+1
=− h†Kn+1
(
n+1∑
a=1
tat
†
a
)
hKn+1 = −
n+1∑
a=1
∣∣∣h†Kn+1ta∣∣∣2 ≤ 0.
(12)
By the definition of Zn, the relationship Zn ≥
log2
(
1 + ρmh
†
Kn+1
hKn+1
)
holds. As a result,
∆Kn+1,n = log2
(
1 + ρmh
†
Kn+1
Tm,n+1hKn+1
)
≤ log2
(
1 + ρmh
†
Kn+1
hKn+1
)
≤ Zn.
(13)
By Equ. (10) and Equ. (13), C˜m,n+1 ≤ C˜m,n holds, which
indicates that C˜m,n is monotonically decreasing with the
increase of the number of the selected antennas.
As Zn is the maximal value in each level, they are con-
stants once the search tree is fixed. Therefore, maximiz-
ing Cm,n is equivalent to maximizing C˜m,n by Equ. (10).
Branch-and-bound search is suitable to find maximum with
a monotonically-decreasing object function [16]. Suppose that
the depth-first and best-first strategy is used during tree search.
Since the object function C˜m,n along a path is decreasing,
the object function value of a complete path from the root
node to the tip node could serve as a lower bound for other
nodes. For example, when a node ’A’ of a path in the qth
level is visited, all the child nodes produced by ’A’ can be
discard if the real-time object function value C˜m,q is smaller
than the lower bound. When we arrive at another tip node,
we need to update the lower bound as the object function
value of this new complete path if the object function value
is larger than the lower bound. This procedure will not stop
until the whole tree is traversed. Let minus infinity be the
initial global lower bound. The tighter the initial bound is,
the lower complexity the BAB algorithm would possess. The
branch-and-bound algorithm is summarized in Alg. 1 attached
with the complexity analysis, where In,k is the sub-node index
set in the nth level of the kth node.
C˜m,n is regarded as the objective function instead of Cm,n,
because the former is monotonically decreasing. During the
procedure of tree search, many nodes could be pruned. Sup-
pose Cm,n was utilized, the whole procedure would degrade
into an exhaustive search with huge computational complexity.
If the tree search stops at the first level, it would degrade
into the norm-based method. During the procedure of branch-
and-bound algorithm, the total number of visited node is
uncertain, the computational complexity could be calculated
by O (NnodeNtNr) where Nnodes denotes the visited nodes’
total number. Many branches are pruned during the algorithm,
thuis it could achieve the optimal solution with much lower
computation cost than exhaustive search.
B. CSIE
The previous section has discussed the scenario without
CSIE. Then, consider the situation when the transmitter have
both full CSIL and full CSIE. The following part moves on to
describe in greater detail that the BAB still works well when
CSIE is available.
Since the transmitter knows the channel matrix of the eaves-
dropper, the antenna selection for the eavesdropper channel
can not be treated as random selection any more and the
channel side information must be taken into consideration. Let
Algorithm 1 BAB search for TAS with NCSIE [17]
1: Tm = INr , B = −∞, C˜m = 0, n = 1, K = 0, s = 0L,
K = {1, 2, · · · , Nt}, L = {1, 2, · · · , L}
2: φk = h
†
khk, ∀k ∈ K ⊲ O (NtNr)
3: ζa = maxk∈Ia φk, Za = log2 (1 + ρmζa) , ∀a ∈ L
4: ∆k = log2 (1 + ρmφk) , ∀k ∈ K
5: if n = L then
6: ck := C˜m +∆k − ZL, ∀k ∈ IL,K
7: if maxm∈IL,K cm < B then
8: [s]L = argmaxm∈IL,K cm
9: B := maxm∈IL,K cm, and sˆ := s
10: end if
11: else
12: ck := C˜m +∆k − Zn, ∀j ∈ In,K
13: sort ck, ∀k ∈ In,K in a descend order to get an ordered
index vector k
14: Tm,tmp := Tm, φtmp,k := φk , ∀k ∈ K
15: for i = 1 : |In,K | do
16: K = [k]i
17: if cK > B then
18: Q := {K + 1,K + 2, · · · , Nt}
19: [s]n = K
20: tm :=
TmhK√
(ρm)
−1+φtmp,K
⊲ O (N2t Nnodes)
21: Tm := Tm,tmp − tmt†m
22: C˜m := cK
23: ξa := h
†
atm, ∀a ∈ Q ⊲ O (NtNrNnodes)
24: φa := φtmp,a−|ξa|2 , ∀a ∈ Q ⊲ O (NtNnodes)
25: ∆a := log2 (1 + ρmφa) , ∀a ∈ Q
⊲O (NtNrNnodes)
26: n := n+ 1, jump to line 5
27: else
28: break the loop
29: end if
30: end for
31: end if
32: return the final set sˆ
Hm,n andHe,n denote the submatrix of legitimate channel and
eavesdropper channel after n antennas are selected and Cs,n
denote the corresponding secrecy capacity. Assuming that the
kth column hm,k of matrix Hm is selected at the (n+ 1)
step, the channel matrix is denoted by [Hm,n,hk]. For the
eavesdropper, the kth column he,k of matrix He is selected.
Following the similar steps in Equ. (7) yields another recursive
formulation
Cs,n+1 = Cs,n + log2
(
1 + ρmh
†
m,kTm,nhm,k
1 + ρeh
†
e,kTe,nhe,k
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆k,n
, (14)
where Tm,n =
(
INr + ρmHm,nH
†
m,n
)−1
and Te,n =(
INe + ρeHe,nH
†
e,n
)−1
. By the Sherman-Morrison formula,
these expressions are simplified as follows:
Tm,n+1 = Tm,n − tm,n+1t†m,n+1, (15a)
Te,n+1 = Te,n − te,n+1t†e,n+1, (15b)
in which tm,n+1 and te,n+1 hold the similar expressions as
tn+1 in Section III-A.
Define
φm,k,n+1 = φm,k,n − |ξm,k,n+1|2 , (16a)
φe,k,n+1 = φe,k,n − |ξe,j,n+1|2 , (16b)
where ξm,k,n+1 = h
†
m,ktm,n+1 and ξe,k,n+1 = h
†
e,kte,n+1.
Then,∆k,n = log2 (1 + ρmφm,k,n)−log2 (1 + ρeφe,k,n). Cs,L
should be adjusted to a monotonically-decreasing function,
that is
C˜s,n = Cs,n −
n−1∑
a=0
Za, (17)
where Za = log2
(
1 + ρmζ
2
a
) − log2 (1 + ρeηa), in which
ζ2a = maxk∈Ia h
†
m,khm,k and ηa is defined as ηa =
mink∈Ia h
†
e,k
(
INe + ρeHeH
†
e
)−1
he,k. The index set Ia con-
sists of all the candidate antenna set in the ath level, and
Z0 = 0. Suppose that the Kn+1th antenna has been selected
in the (n+ 1)th step, a recursive formula is derived, namely
C˜s,n+1 = C˜s,n +∆Kn+1,n − Zn. (18)
Since Te,n+1 = INe−
∑n+1
a=1 te,at
†
e,a, once all the Nt antennas
are selected, Te,Nt is a constant by its definition i.e., Te,Nt =
INe−
∑Ne
a=1 te,at
†
e,a =
(
INe + ρeHeH
†
e
)−1
, which shows that
Te,Nt is fixed in any selection order. Therefore,
h
†
e,Kn+1
Te,n+1he,Kn+1 − h†e,Kn+1Te,Nehe,Kn+1
(a)
=h†Kn+1
(
Ne∑
a=n+2
tat
†
a
)
hKn+1 =
Ne∑
a=n+2
∣∣∣h†Kn+1ta∣∣∣2 ≥ 0.
(19)
The step (a) in Equ. (19) holds for that one could treat Te,Ne
as the result of any selection order which includes the first
(n+ 1) antennas index that results in Te,n+1.
According to the definition of ηa, ηa =
mink∈Ia h
†
e,kTe,Nehe,k, thus ηa ≤ h†e,Kn+1Te,Kn+1he,Kn+1 .
In addition, it has been proved in Equ. (12) and (13) that
h
†
m,Kn+1
Tm,Nmhm,Kn+1 ≤ ζ2a. Consequently,
∆Kn+1,n = log2
(
1 + ρmh
†
m,Kn+1
Tm,n+1hm,Kn+1
1 + ρeh
†
e,Kn+1
Te,n+1he,Kn+1
)
≤ log2
(
1 + ρmζ
2
a
)− log2 (1 + ρeηa) = Zn.
(20)
Thus C˜s,n+1 ≤ C˜s,n holds by Equ. (18), which indicates that
C˜s,n+1 is monotonically decreasing. It’s clear that the branch-
and-bound for the situation with full CSIE is different from
the one with NCSIE. In Section III-A, the monotonically-
increasing function Cm,n is adjusted to a monotonically-
decreasing function C˜m,n. Nevertheless, the original function
Cs,n isn’t monotonic, which makes it even harder to do
the construction. The branch-and-bound with full CSIE is
Algorithm 2 BAB search for TAS with CSIE.
1: Tm = INr , Te = INe , B = −∞, C˜s = 0, n = 1,K0 = 0,
s = 0L, K = {1, 2, · · · , Nt}, L = {1, 2, · · · , L}
2: φm,k = h
†
m,khm,k, φe,k = h
†
e,khe,k, ∀k ∈ K
3: ζa = maxk∈Ia φm,k, ∀a ∈ L
4: ηa = mink∈Ia h
†
e,k
(
INe + ρeHeH
†
e
)−1
he,k, ∀a ∈ L
5: Za = log2
(
1 + ρmζ
2
a
)− log2 (1 + ρeηa) , ∀a ∈ L
6: ∆k = log2 (1 + ρmφm,k)− log2 (1 + ρeφe,k) , ∀k ∈ K,
7: if n = L then
8: ck := C˜s +∆k − ZL, ∀k ∈ IL,K
9: if maxm∈IL,K cm < B then
10: [s]L = argmaxm∈IL,K cm
11: B := maxm∈IL,K cm, and sˆ := s
12: end if
13: else
14: ck := C˜s +∆k − Zn, ∀k ∈ In,K
15: sort ck, ∀k ∈ In,K in a descend order to get an ordered
index vector k
16: Tm,tmp:=Tm, φm,tmp,k:=φm,k, ∀k ∈ K
Te,tmp:=Te, φe,tmp,k:=φe,k, ∀k ∈ K
17: for i = 1 : |In,K | do
18: K = [k]i
19: if cK > B then
20: Q := {K + 1,K + 2, · · · , Nt}
21: [s]n+1 = K
22: tm:=
Tmhm,K√
(ρm)
−1+φm,tmp,K
Tm:=Tm,tmp − tmt†m
te:=
Tehe,K√
(ρe)
−1+φe,tmp,K
Te:=Te,tmp − tet†e
23: C˜s,n:=cK
24: ξm,a:=h
†
m,atm, ξe,a:=h
†
e,ate, ∀a ∈ Q
25: φm,a:=φm,tmp,a − |ξm,a|2 , ∀a ∈ Q
φe,a:=φe,tmp,a − |ξe,a|2 , ∀a ∈ Q
26: ∆a:= log2
(
1+ρmφm,a
1+ρeφe,a
)
, ∀a ∈ Q
27: n := n+ 1, jump to line 7
28: else
29: break the loop
30: end if
31: end for
32: end if
33: return the final set sˆ
summarized in Alg. 2, where In,k is the subnode index set of
the jth node in the nth level. Similar as Alg. 1, the complexity
of Alg. 2 is O (NnodesNtmax (Nr, Ne)) where Nnodes denotes
the total number of the visited nodes,
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
This part gives the simulation results followed by the com-
putation complexity analysis of all the proposed algorithms.
Fig. 2 presents the ergodic secrecy capacity versus ρm when
CSIE is unavailable at the transmitter. As is shown in Fig. 2,
BAB based search has superior performance in all conditions
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Fig. 2. Ergodic secrecy capacity verus ρ
m
using BAB-based and norm-based
method with NCSIE, Nr = 4, Ne = 8, L = 4 and ρe = 5dB.
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Fig. 3. Ergodic secrecy capacity verus ρ
m
using BAB-based and norm-based
method with CSIE, Nr = 4, Ne = 8, L = 4 and ρe = 5dB.
compared with the norm-based search. Furthermore, Fig. 3
shows the ergodic secrecy capacity for BAB method and norm-
based method when CSIE is available. Also, it can be seen
from the figure that BAB still outperforms the norm based
method. Finally, to verify that the branch-and-bound search
has the same optimal performance as exhaustive search, Fig.
4 compares the ergodic secrecy capacity of BAB and ES in
both NCSIE and CSIE cases. It is apparent from Fig. 4 that
the BAB search can find the optimal antenna index subset to
maximize the secrecy capacity.
Fig. 5 provides the complexity of the BAB, norm-based
and ES method. As stated before, they can all be treated as
tree search and the complexity of BAB is related with the
number of visited nodes. Therefore, it makes sense to use the
number of visited nodes asking for updating operations during
the tree search to measure the complexity of these algorithms
[17]. As shown in Fig. 5, the norm-based method has the
lowest complexity and the complexity of ES is much higher
than that of the BAB. Based on above simulation results, the
advantages of BAB are apparent for its optimality and low-
complexity. To examine the robustness of the BAB method,
Fig. 6 shows the complexity versus ρm and ρe. From this
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figure, it is clear that there are scarcely no great fluctuation
in complexity for different ρm. Additionally, the complexity
will increase as ρe rises up, which indicates that the BAB
algorithm is more efficient under more secure transmission
condition. Nevertheless, the fluctuation due to ρe is not very
large. Taken together, the proposed BAB method is robust and
practical, especially for the scenario with NCSIE.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper studies transmit antenna selection in massive MI-
MOME channels. An optimal algorithm based on branch-and
bound search is proposed and discussed in the situations when
the CSIE is available or unavailable. Simulation shows that
branch-and-bound search can guarantee optimal performance
with much lower complexity compared with exhaustive search.
The proposed algorithm could serve as a benchmark in the
future work on TAS algorithm design in massive MIMOME
channels.
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